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Mark and Shuck: Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:

COMMENTS
WYOMING TORT REFORM AND THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: A SECOND
OPINION

INTRODUCTION

For nearly twenty years, Wyoming and the nation have faced
problems with medical malpractice insurance availability and affordability.' The media and the public labeled these problems an
"insurance crisis." ' 2 Over this twenty-year period, insurance premiums unexpectedly increased and certain lines of medical malpractice
insurance became unavailable at any price. During the peak years
of 1975 and 1986, the crisis' effects were more pronounced.' This
insurance crisis has continued to ignite heated debates among insurers, physicians, consumer advocates, and trial attorneys.' While
these parties have not agreed as to the cause of the insurance crisis
or the best solution, all parties have agreed that finding and affording insurance continues to be a crucial problem in our society.,
Intense public pressure to resolve the crisis caused state legislatures nationwide during the 1970's and 1980's to gather information from the insurance industry, medical community, and the

1. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE
STATISTICS 1 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, R-3391-ICJ, 1987). See High Insurance Rates
Concern Obstetricians, NORTHERN Wyo. DAILY NEWS (Worland, Wyo.), Feb. 12, 1988, at
12 [hereinafter Rates Concern Obstetricians]; Wyoming DoctorsFace Rising Insurance Rates,
NORTHERN Wyo. DAILY NEWS (Worland, Wyo.), June 6, 1985, at 7 [hereinafter Rising Insurance Rates].
2. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 1. The medical malpractice insurance crisis also
effected not only medical professionals, but government entities as well. See Insurer Drops
State Coverage, THE POWELL TRIBUNE (Powell, Wyo.), Sept. 26, 1985 (available through the
University of Wyoming Coe Library newspaper clippings file under the heading "insurance").
In the mid-1980's, the State of Wyoming and numerous Wyoming municipalities found insurers were unwilling to renew municipal liability insurance policies. Some insurers were
willing to extend liability coverage to the State "if high-risk facilities such as hospitals ...
could be excluded" from coverage. Id. See also Lawmakers Hope to Deal with State Insurance Crisis, NEWS RECORD (Gillette, Wyo.), Feb. 11, 1986, at 14 [hereinafter Lawmakers].
3. In 1974 and 1975, most state legislatures were under intense pressure to resolve
that decade's insurance crisis. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2 (1985).
The second peak occurred in the mid 1980's. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to
the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207,
214 (1990).
4. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 1.
5. Id.
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legal profession. Much of the information was conflicting. 6 The major underlying conflict was whether the tort system had become
skewed in favor of plaintiffs and was encouraging litigation. Even
with little concrete data available, the insurance lobby was effective
in convincing most state legislatures that a litigation crisis 7 existed
thereby causing a recurring insurance crisis.' Many state legislatures,
including the Wyoming Legislature, responded with significant tort
reform legislation in the mid-1970's and again in the mid-1980's. 9
Recently, political debates centering on a nationwide health care
insurance crisis have renewed interest in tort reform as a means to
control health care costs.' 0 In Wyoming, medical interest groups and
medical malpractice insurers continue to pressure the Wyoming Legislature to enact tort reforms." However, before the Wyoming Legislature considers future tort reforms to control either medical

6. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 16-32 (discussing the conflicting views of
tort reform proponents and opponents).
7.

1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 23

(1991) [hereinafter A.L.I.L. The term "litigation crisis" describes a perceived explosion in
the number of suits filed. Many argue that this increase is a result of our society's changing
expectations and values. It is now much more acceptable to consult with a lawyer and file
a tort claim. People feel more entitled to a higher level of protection against bodily injury
both before and after an accident occurs. Id.
8. DANZON, supra note 3, at 2. Empirical evidence was not available in the 1970's or
the 1980's to resolve the conflicting views. Id. Commentators claim the insurance industry
began a concentrated campaign in 1984 in which it placed most of the blame at the feet of
the tort law system. By 1986, the Insurance Information Institute reportedly was spending
six and one-half million dollars on advertising and other efforts to tie the insurance crisis
to the need for tort reform. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 214.
9. TARKY LOMBARDI,

JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW

118-19 (1978). In the mid-1970's, 49 states passed legislation designed to address the medical
malpractice crisis. Id. Many states enacted additional tort reforms between 1985 and 1988.
Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 210. Compare Tamara K. Vincelette, Comment, Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: The Boys Who Cry "Wolf, " 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 203
(1986) (arguing against enactment of tort reform in Wyoming). For commentary on tort
reform in other states, see Pamela Burch Fort et al., Florida's Tort Reform: Response to
a Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 505 (1986); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The
Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of ItAll, 49 LA. L. REV. 629 (1989); Kathy
T. Graham, 1987 Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Reform or Mere Restatement?, 24
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 283 (1988); David A. Kramer, Issues and Ramifications of Texas Tort
Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713 (1987); Leonard Schulte, Availability, Affordability and
Accountability Regulatory Reform of Insurance, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 557 (1986); Note,
Maureen Roach Tobin, The Current Status of Tort Reform in Iowa, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 859
(1986-87).
10. Rxfor Health Care, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1992, at 20. President Bush supported
limiting malpractice awards and insurance-industry reforms. Id. Indeed, the 1992 presidential
race may have been heavily influenced by the insurance crisis. As noted in a newspaper
article, "[a] Gallup poll last year showed 91 % of Americans believe the nation faces a healthcare crisis." Peter A. Brown, Candidates Offer Health-Care Remedies, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 4. Some politicians believe the medical community's fears of personal
liability and further increases in medical malpractice insurance have been driving the increase
in health care costs. Id.
11. Legislative Perspective, THE COFFEE HOUSE (Wyo. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Cheyenne,

Wyo.), Mar. 1992, at 6.
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malpractice or health care insurance costs, it should assess the success of past tort reforms.
This comment's treatment of the medical malpractice insurance
crisis is analogous to the diagnostic process used by a physician who
is consulted for a second opinion. Just as the physician compiles a
medical history, investigates the symptoms, and reviews prior treatment efforts before prescribing a new treatment, this comment follows a similar course. First, this comment compiles a "patient
history" and investigates symptoms by examining the historical information. Second, this comment reviews the "past treatments" of
the insurance crisis by outlining the various Wyoming legislative and
court-initiated reforms. Next, this section strives to determine whether
a litigation crisis actually existed and could have caused an insurance
crisis. Finally, this comment analyzes whether past reforms were
necessary to treat any underlying insurance crisis and offers a "second opinion" concerning the future course of treatment.
BACKGROUND

"Patient History"

The term "tort reform' ' 1 2 describes the means to achieving several goals. Tort reforms are enacted to reduce claim frequency, reduce claim severity, 3 and eliminate frivolous and unfairly stale
lawsuits, thereby reducing insurance premium prices and improving
insurance availability. 4 Generally, these reforms function by reducing plaintiffs' access to the courts, reducing plaintiffs' chances
of prevailing at trial, or reducing plaintiffs' chances of fully recovering.'5

12. In the mid-1980's, the term "tort reform" became widely used to describe what
legislatures looked to as a cure for the perceived ailing legal system. See, e.g., Malpractice
Premiums Skyrocketing for Doctors, NEws RECORD (Gillette, Wyo.), June 6, 1985, at 5
[hereinafter Malpractice Premiums Skyrocket] (stating medical malpractice insurance could
become unavailable if tort reforms were not enacted).
13. "Claim frequency" is the conventional term used to describe the number of claims
filed. "Claim severity" refers to those factors affecting an insurer's ability to predict future
payouts. These factors include the probability that a claim will be paid, the amount of
payment and the speed with which a claim is resolved. See DANZON, supra note 3, at 2021. An additional tort reform goal for many state legislatures has been reducing the uncertainty of jury award sizes. These legislatures have passed reforms limiting plaintiffs' damage awards, typically referred to as caps on damages. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 2. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 223.
15. See LomaARDi, supra note 9. See also Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical
Malpractice:Further Developments and a PreliminaryReport Card, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV.
499, 513 (1989). The major tort reforms of the 1970's and 1980's have been categorized as
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Tort reform is a political issue which requires recognition of
both tort reform proponents' and opponents' views. Proponents claim
the tort system has become so plaintiff-oriented that the process is
really a game of chance for defendants.16 Proponents urge that an
expansion of tort plaintiffs' rights has caused an excessive number
of lawsuits. 7 In their opinion, many claims are frivolous or unfairly
stale. Moreover, they feel the present tort system often pays too
much. 8 Proponents also contend that judges and juries frequently

follows:
A.

Aimed at the number of lawsuits (insurance "frequency"):
1. Arbitration
2. Attorney fee controls
3. Certificate of merit
4. Costs awardable
5. Pretrial screening panels
6. Statutes of limitations
B. Aimed at size of recoveries ("severity"):
1. Ad damnum clauses restricted
2. "Caps" on awards (non-economic, total)
3.
Collateral source offset (permissive, mandatory)
4. Joint & several liability changes
5. Periodic payments of damages ("structured" awards)
6. Punitive damage limits
C. Aimed at plaintiffs difficulty (or costs) of winning:
1. Expert witness requirements
2. Informed consent limits
3. Professional standard of care reasserted
4. Res ipsa loquitur restrictions
5. Statute of frauds for medical promises
D. Aimed at functioning, cost of judicial process:
1. Mediation
2. Notice of intent to sue
3. Pre-calendar conference required
4. Preferred scheduling for malpractice cases
E. Miscellaneous
1. Extension of Good Samaritan statutes
2. Immunity for school athletic injuries
3. All other.
Id. Other reform efforts were directed at the insurance and medical industries, and have
been categorized as follows:
A. Insurance reforms
I. Joint Underwriting Associations
2. Limits on insurance cancellation
3. Mandates for liability coverage
4. Patient Compensation Funds
5. Reporting Requirements
B. Reforms Aimed at Medical Quality
1. Peer review requirements, protection from lawsuits
2. Powers of disciplinary boards increased
3. Reporting requirements, data compilations
4. Requirements for continuing medical education
Id.
16. Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 507. "Clearly a general 'liberalization' of commonlaw doctrines and processes in recent decades has favored plaintiffs." Id. at 506.
17. Id. at 506-07.
18. Id. at 507.
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make poor decisions about fault.19 They urge this is particularly true
if the defendant is an institution or corporation whom jurors perceive as having "deep pockets." 2 0 Proponents believe legislative tort
2
reforms offer a solution to inequitable treatment of defendants, '
while at the same time preserving the tort system's basic functions
of compensation and deterrence. They also urge that tort reform
removes
the emotionalism often involved in medical malpractice law22
suits.
Further, proponents advise that tort reform provides increased
certainty at two levels. 23 First, increased certainty allows physicians
to know exactly what negligence is actionable and encourages them
to limit their defensive medical practices accordingly. 24 Second, increased certainty allows insurance companies to more accurately predict underwriting risk. 25 Proponents conclude that increased certainty
ultimately will provide all medical specialties with adequate insurance coverage 26at reasonable premiums and will prevent future insurance crises.
In contrast, opponents argue that tort reform will not solve the
insurance crisis. Some opponents believe that incompetent doctors2"

19. Id.
20. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 256 & n.197; see Ed Won't Sign: InsuranceBill
Said 'Horrible',POWELL TRIBUNE (Powell, Wyo.), Mar. 18, 1986, at 9 [hereinafter Ed Won't
Sign] (explaining the "deep pocket" theory).
21. See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 507.
22. Id. at 508. Proponents claim that allowing plaintiffs to bring medical malpractice
cases several years after the allegedly negligent act, coupled with overly-sympathetic juries,

often color results. Id.
23. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 232 (discussing the problem of uncertainty
generally).
24. Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 509. "Defensive medicine has been defined as 'a deviation from what the physician believes is sound practice, and is generally so regarded,
induced by a threat of liability ....
Not all practices motivated for liability considerations
result in poor-quality care. It is, therefore, difficult to draw the line between where good
medicine stops and defensive practice begins."' DANzoN, supra note 3, at 146.
25. Cf., Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 232. In the insurance industry, the party
assuming a risk in return for the payment of a premium is the "underwriter." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1527 (6th ed. 1990). "Insurance risk" is defined as the danger of a loss resulting
from the uncertainty that actual future returns or losses will deviate from expected returns
or losses. Id. at 1328.
26. Frank A. Sloan, Responses to the Malpractice "Insurance Crisis" of the 1970's:
An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 629, 633 (1985). "Legislators
assumed that, if new laws could reduce the number and dollar amounts of malpractice awards,
insurers would be in a better position to predict recoveries, and therefore would maintain
coverage at reasonable rates and assure availability of malpractice insurance". Id. See Sanders
& Joyce, supra note 3, at 217 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 45-52 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Dep't of Justice

Rep. 1).
27. Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis Of The Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 683, 689-94 (1991). Conservative studies estimate
five to ten percent of doctors are incompetent, while other studies indicate four to thirty
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and the insurance industry have caused the insurance crisis of the
past two decades. 28 Opponents claim the insurance industry exercised
poor business judgments which resulted in the boom and bust cycles
of profitability, price, and availability. 29 They also claim that insurance companies have drastically increased transaction costs by
aggressively defending against claims.3 0 Reform opponents argue that
holding the medical community civilly liable for improper actions
has deterrent value and may actually reduce medical costs by preventing unnecessary injuries. Although the costs of litigating over
cause and fault create added overhead costs, injury costs savings
outweigh the added overhead costs.3' For these reasons, opponents
view physician peer review and increased insurance industry accountability as better
solutions than tort reform to prevent future
32

insurance crises.

During the peak years of 1975 and 1986, the Wyoming Legislature was under pressure similar to other state legislatures to resolve the medical malpractice insurance crisis.33 Wyoming legislators

percent are incompetent. Id. Before 1986, no national system existed for identifying and
removing incompetent physicians. Id. at 737. The prior system allowed a "rogue physician,"

whose license was suspended in one state, to set up practice in another state. Id. The HCQIA
resolved the "rogue physician" problem by establishing a peer review system and requiring
submission of reports to the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at 684. In
drafting the HCQIA, Congress Was careful to remove disincentives to participating in the
program. The doctors participating in the peer review are immune from libel suits. The
reports now make it possible to study the frequency and severity of malpractice claims nationwide. Id. at 689, 729. The HCQIA is a good example of a reform which does not narrow
plaintiffs' rights or impact tort law. Id. at 737.
28. Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 399, 400 (1987).
29. Id. Another commentator noted "[tlhe phenomenon known as the 'underwriting
cycle' is unique to the insurance industry and represents a significant cause of the periodic
malpractice insurance crises." David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495,
1525 & n.68 (1988) (providing a brief description of the underwriting cycle and listing other
authorities which discuss the subject in depth). This article explains that the underwriting
cycle peaked in 1985, which is approximately the time of the second peak in the insurance
crisis. Id. Alternatively, opponents claim that insurance companies may have been in collusion. The collusion explanation is fueled in part by the virtual exemption of insurance
companies from federal antitrust laws through the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-15 (1982 & Supp. 1985). But see Richard N. Clarke et al., Sources of the Crisis in
Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 377-84 (1988) (arguing
against the collusion theory). See discussion infra notes 35-37 (discussing insurance reforms).
30. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 216 n.35. For example, insurance companies'
defense costs tripled from 1975 to 1986. In 1986, insurance companies were paying defense
lawyers 46 cents for every dollar paid to injury victims. This increase in transaction costs
directly affected insurance rates. Id.
31. DANZON, supra note 3, at 221. Only a small percentage of malpractice incidents
ever culminate in filed claims and an even smaller percentage of claims result in compensation. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES IN THE U.S.: COSTS,
COMPENSATION AND CILAMING BEHAVIOR (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1991).
32. Adler, supra note 27, at 685.
33. The Wyoming Medical Association has been active in lobbying for tort reforms.
See, e.g., Minutes of the Ann. Meeting of the Wyo. St. Bar, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv.
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received conflicting information from lobbyists on both sides but
received little empirical data. Despite this lack of statistical data,
the Wyoming Legislature attempted to resolve the crisis utilizing
three basic approaches: (1) enacting new requirements for the insurance industry, (2) deregulating other aspects of the insurance industry, and (3) enacting tort reforms.3 4 Beginning in 1976, the
legislature required all medical malpractice insurers to annually report all claims against and all awards or settlements made on behalf
of health care providers.35 In 1983, the legislature deregulated in36
surance price-setting by enacting the "Competitive Rating Act."

307, 310-311 (1976) [hereinafter Wyoming St. Bar Minutes].
A representative from the Wyoming Medical Association spoke at the annual bar
convention meeting and described the group's legislative efforts. . . . [T]he Wyoming Medical Association has drafted a proposed bill that contains the following
proposals:
(1) That insurance companies .. .report all claims and pay-outs.
(2) That the medical malpractice statute of limitation be reduced to two years
with no tolling provision for minors.
(3) That recoveries in the case of a minor be paid not in cash, but in annuities
(meaning that the attorney must wait for his fee).
(4) That all insurance companies be required to join an underwriting pool and
be required to underwrite doctors even if the particular company does not normally
underwrite medical malpractice policies.
(5) That a disabled physicians' act be adopted.
(6) That contingent fees for medical malpractice litigation be reduced to fifteen
percent.
(7) That the concept of informed consent be completely revised.
(8) That the peer review committee be made totally immune from liability.
(9) That the res ipsa loquitur rule no longer be applied to the medical profession.
(10) That a patient's compensation fund be established.
(11) That prior to filing a complaint sixty days notice be given to the defendant.
(12) That the rule of implied warranty be eliminated.
(13) That the collateral source rule be eliminated.
(14) That punitive damages be eliminated.
(15) That an assigned risk law be adopted.
(16) That Wyoming's constitutional provision on wrongful death, Article I, Section 8, be amended.
(17) That a model counterclaim abuse of process law be adopted eliminating
separate actions.
Id.
34. Even though the Wyoming Legislature has never directed reform at physicians, the
United States Congress responded to the 1986 medical malpractice crisis by enacting the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 42 U.S.C.A. § 1011-52 (West Supp.
1989). See discussion of this Act supra note 27.
35. WYo. STAT. §§ 26-3-123 to -124 (1991). Prior to 1976, the state required insurers
to submit information regarding only their financial condition and transactions of the previous twelve months. Id. § 26-3-123. Beginning in 1976, the Wyoming Legislature required
medical malpractice policy underwriters to also annually report all claims against, and all
awards or settlements made on behalf of, health care providers. Id.§ 26-3-124. See id.§
26-3-125 (requiring insurers offering coverage to governmental entities to make an additional
report of the number of claims filed, amount paid, amount of premiums received, and the
number of policies canceled).
36. 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 186, §§ 1-4. The Competitive Rating Act effectively
deleted the Wyoming Insurance Department's (W.I.D.) authority to review and approve rates
for most lines of insurance. 5 STATE OF Wyo. ANN. REP., Insurance Dep't 5 (1986) [here-
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In 1988, the legislature amended this act, thereby vesting the Wyoming Insurance Department (W.I.D.) with authority to re-regulate lines
of insurance after the W.I.D. Commissioner deemed them to have
become "noncompetitive."7
"Review of Prior Treatments"
1.

Wyoming Tort Reform: 1976 to 1985

The bulk of the Wyoming Legislature's response to the insurance crisis came in the area of tort reform.3 8 In 1976, the Wyoming
Legislature responded to the perceived medical malpractice crisis by
passing legislation designed to limit plaintiffs' rights.3 9 These statutes
prohibited ad damnum clauses and decreased the time period under
the statute of limitations for professional liability actions. The fol-

inafter 1986 Ann. Rep.]. Deregulation also allowed Wyoming insurance companies to use
any region in the country for purposes of experience to set rates. Insurance companies set
prices based on underwriting risk. In turn, this underwriting risk is based on many factors.
The historical data analyzing these factors is called "purposes of experience." For example,
a Wyoming insurance company may use Florida for purposes of experience to underwrite
obstetrical insurance. Because Florida's obstetrical malpractice claims in the 1980's were the
highest in the country, obstetrical insurance during this period was virtually eliminated.
Therefore, using Florida for purposes of experience, a Wyoming insurer could eliminate
coverage in Wyoming even though there may have been no malpractice claims in Wyoming.
5 STATE OF Wyo. ANN. REP., Insurance Dep't 5 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Ann. Rep.]. In
this 1988 report, the W.I.D. responded once again to the "availability and affordability
crisis," stating that reforms should be aimed at the insurance industry. The W.I.D. requested
reinstatement of its authority over rates to ensure the rates charged are fair. The W.I.D.
further requested to have the authority to dictate to the insurance companies which regions
in the country can be used for purposes of experience. Id. Such reforms may be justified,
since the use of foreign experience ratings earned Wyoming medical malpractice insurers
337.2% profit on premiums in 1985, while the average medical malpractice insurer earned
15.3% on premiums. National Insurance Consumer OrganizationAnalyzes Wyoming's Malpractice Rates, THE COFFEE HOUSE (Wyo. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Cheyenne, Wyo.), Spring
1988, at 21 [hereinafter Wyo. Malpractice Rates]. See 5 1986 Ann. Rep., supra note 36.
37. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 56, § 1. Under the amendment, a "noncompetitive market" is:
(D) any market in which:
(I)
There are less than five (5) insurers actually issuing a particular line
of insurance as determined by the commissioner;
(II)
Three (3) insurers transact more than ninety percent (90%) of the business;
(1i1) Two (2) insurers transact more than eighty percent (80%) of the business; or
(IV) There is reasonable evidence, as determined by the commissioner, of
collusion among insurers in setting prices.
WYO. STAT. § 26-14-103(a)(vii) (1991). When the W.I.D. Commissioner finds that a market
is noncompetitive, he may then re-regulate those rates. Id. § 26-14-106(b) (1991). Moreover,
the amendment empowers the W.I.D. Commissioner to dictate which regions of the country
can be used for purposes of experience. Id. § 26-14-106(f)(iv) (1991).
38. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1319 (1989) (stating that most recent legislative
reforms have been constructed to protect potential civil defendants).
39. Id.
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lowing year, the Wyoming
State Bar recommended new restrictions
40
on contingent fees.
The Wyoming Legislature restricted the use of ad damnum
clauses by prohibiting plaintiffs from pleading the specific amount
of damages sought. 4' The statute did not, however, limit the amount
of damages which could be requested at trial. Some lawmakers believed that "requiring [plaintiffs] to declare damages sought before
trial [could] contribute to unreasonably high [jury] awards.... "42
The Wyoming Legislature also shortened the statute of limitations
time period for negligence actions brought against persons "rendering . . . licensed or certified professional or health care services
.... "4 The statute decreased the time from four years to two years,
and thereby expanded the existing protection for medical personnel.4"
During the mid-1970's, the legal community also considered
contingent fees as an area needing reform. 4 At the time, no clear
standards had been adopted for fixing contingent fee percentages.
The Wyoming Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) was the
only rule which addressed contingent fees to any extent." However,
the Code was vague in this area and merely prohibited 'attorneys
from collecting "an illegal or clearly excessive fee."147 Then in 1977,

40. Minutes of the Ann. Meeting of the Bd. of Comm'rs of the Wyo. St. Bar, 13
LAND & WATER L. REv. 679, 681-83 (1978). These recommendations were later forwarded
to the court rules committee. See In the Matter of Amended Rules for the Org. and Gov't
of the Wyo. St. Bar for Att'ys at Law of the St. of Wyo., 493-501 Wyo. XX (West 1973).
41. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-114 (1988). See also Wyo. R. Crv. P. 8. See Adler, supra note
27, at 685 n. 10 (stating that most state legislatures enacted legislation revoking "the plaintiff's
right to name a specific dollar amount in his . .. complaint").
42. Committee Urges Court to Consider Recommendations About Coverage, ROCK
SPRTNGs DAILY ROCKET-MINER (Rock Springs, Wyo.), Oct. 24, 1985, at 1.
43. WYo. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1988). "Licensed professionals" includes psychologists, lawyers and accountants in addition to physicians. "Health care services" includes numerous
specialized vocations within the health care field. Id. The statute provided minors with a
separate statute of limitations. WYo. STAT. § l-3-107(a)(ii) (1988). Compare Wyo. STAT. §
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1988) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for most other negligence
actions).
44. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1988).
45. Wyoming St. Bar Minutes, supra note 33, at 310-11. The Wyoming Medical Association proposed reducing contingent fees in all civil court cases to fifteen percent. Id.
46. WYo. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (1971). See
In the Matter of Amended Rules for the Org. and Gov't of the Wyo. St. Bar for Att'ys at
Law of the St. of Wyo., 493-501 Wyo. XX (West 1973) (adopting the A.B.A. Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, with amendments, as the ethical code governing Wyoming
attorneys). Cf. Wyo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5 (1986). In 1986, the Wyoming State Bar adopted the Rules, thereby replacing the Code. Rule 1.5 addresses fee arrangements with even less specificity than Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code.
47. WYOMING CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONStaILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A) (1971).
A fee is not clearly excessive unless "a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with the
definite andfirm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." Id., Disciplinary
Rule 2-106(B) (emphasis added). The Code also provided recommendations for attorneys in
setting fees. Id., Ethical Considerations 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, and 2-20.
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the Wyoming Supreme Court approved new rules specifically governing contingent fees." These disciplinary rules limit the cases in
which contingent fee agreements are appropriate, provide a process
and standards for judicial review of contingent fee agreements, provide a schedule of circumstances under which a contingent fee agreement is presumed to be reasonable, and provide a list of factors to
consider when determining whether a contingent fee agreement is
49
reasonable.

2.

Wyoming Tort Reform: 1986 to 1989

By 1986, the medical malpractice insurance crisis had peaked
again.50 The Wyoming Legislature responded by enacting extensive
reforms during the late-1980's.11 These reforms were designed to
discourage frivolous malpractice claims,5 2 curb increases in prem-

48. See generally Rules Governing Contingent Fees for Members of the Wyoming State
Bar (1977) (neprinted in the "Wyoming Court Rules" volume of the Wyoming Statutes in
the "Attorneys" section).
49. -Id., Rules 3; 5(a), (b), (f), and (g) (1986). Contingent fees can reasonably range
from one percent to fifty percent, depending on the circumstances. Id.
50. Malpractice Premiums Skyrocketing, supra note 12 (reporting that medical malpractice insurance could become unavailable if tort reforms are not enacted). See also Bovbjerg,
supra note 15, at 503; But see Vincelette, supra note 9, at 209 (casting doubt on the existence
of a medical malpractice crisis in the mid-1980's).
51. Among the 1986 reforms were numerous statutes enacted which are unrelated to
the medical malpractice crisis and therefore beyond the scope of this comment. See White
v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Wyo. 1989) (listing all the tort reform measures enacted
by the 1986 Wyoming Legislature). One reform was the enactment of a dram shop negligence
action. WYo. STAT. § 12-9-301 (1986). Although the Wyoming Supreme Court historically
declined opportunities to judicially impose dram shop liability, it recanted in 1983 by creating
a new negligence cause of action. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 410 (Wyo. 1983).
As a result of this decision, a person providing alcohol to a minor or an intoxicated person
became liable for any damages caused by the person served. Id. at 412-13. In response to
insurance companies' refusals to renew liability insurance policies for Wyoming bar owners,
the legislature took action to prevent a broad interpretation of McClellan. WYo. STAT. §
12-8-301 (1986). See John Horsley, Insurance Firms Leaving Bars High and Dry, NORTHERN
Wyo. DAILY NEWS (Worland, Wyo.), June 6, 1985, at 3. The statute creates a rule of nonliability except where the defendant has violated Wyoming Statute section 12-5-301(a)(v)
pertaining to drive-thru package liquor stores providing alcohol to minors and intoxicated
persons, or the defendant has violated Wyoming Statute section 12-6-101(a) pertaining to
persons providing alcohol to minors. WYo. STAT. § 12-8-301 (1986).
Other reforms were: (1) limits on liability for amateur rodeos sponsored by public schools
and non-profit organizations, Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-118 (1988); (2) elimination of liability for
the executive decisions made by governmental agencies and non-profit organizations, Wyo.
STAT. § 1-23-107 (1988); and (3) elimination of governmental liability for defects in the design,
construction, and maintenance of streets and highways, WYo. STAT. § 1-39-120 (1988). See
also 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, §§ 1-5 (creating a temporary state emergency self-insurance
program available to both state and local governmental entities through June 30, 1988); 1986
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 81, §§ 1-5 (permitting local governments to participate in the state selfinsurance program until the program expired on June 30, 1988); and 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 6, § 2 (establishing a permanent self-insurance program).
52. WYo. STAT. § 1-14-128 (1988).
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iums, and prevent insurance unavailability." While some of the reforms targeted medical malpractice issues directly, others had an
indirect effect. The direct reforms
were designed to radically curtail
54
medical malpractice litigation.
The Wyoming Legislature joined the majority of states by creating a medical malpractice claim review panel." The Wyoming
Medical Review Panel Act required all potential claimants to submit
their claims to a review panel prior to filing suit.5 6 The goal of this
act was to prevent plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims which would
ultimately reduce the growth of medical malpractice premiums." 7
However, the Wyoming Supreme Court subsequently held that the
Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act violated equal protection principles embodied in the state constitution. 8 As a result, Wyoming is

53. See White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Wyo. 1989) (describing the overall
efforts made by the 1986 Wyoming Legislature to make liability more predictable and make
certain risks more insurable). See, e.g., Dennis Davis, Dram Shop Bill Flies Through: Jones
Insurance Bills Pass, POWELL TRIBUNE (Powell, Wyo.), March 11, 1986; Rep. Tom Jones'
Bill on InsuranceReform Wins Introduction, POWELL TRIBUNE (Powell, Wyo.), Feb. 2, 1986
(available through the University of Wyoming Coe Library newspaper clippings file under
the heading "insurance").
54. One tort reform introduced which was intended to drastically affect medical malpractice litigation was a cap on non-economic damage awards. Although the Governor's
Select Insurance Committee supported caps on damages, many Wyoming attorneys opposed
the measure. Governor's Insurance Panel Supports Ceiling, NORTHERN Wyo. DAILY NEWS
(Worland, Wyo.), Jan. 29, 1986, at 12 (reporting the committee's endorsement of a bill to
limit pain and suffering and punitive damage awards); Survey: Lawyers Oppose Cap on
Damages Awarded, NEWS RECORD (Gillette, Wyo.), Aug. 18, 1987, at 3 (reporting a legislator's and several attorneys' opposition to limiting damage awards). Before the session
ended, this bill was defeated. Jones Insurance Bill Dies in House, POWELL TRIBUNE (Powell,
Wyo.), Feb. 25, 1986 (available through the University of Wyoming Coe Library newspaper
clippings file under the heading "insurance"). The medical lobby has never been successful
in lobbying for caps on damages. However, in 1988 the legislature passed a bill designed to
limit noneconomic damages in cases against accountants. S.F. 0052, 49th Leg., 1st Sess.,
(1988). This bill was later vetoed by the Governor because it purportedly violated article 10,
section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. See Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform, THE
COFFEE HOUSE (Wyo. Trial Lawyers Ass'n), Spring 1988, at 5-6 [hereinafter Constitutional
Challenges] (reporting case law from other jurisdictions which held damage caps unconstitutional).
55. WYo. STAT. §§ 9-2-1501 to -1511 (1988).
56. Id. The review panel consisted of a five member board, including two health care
providers, two attorneys, and one lay member. Id., § 9-2-1508(a). But see Attorneys Oppose
Rules for Review Panel, ROCK SPRINGS DAILY ROCKET-MINER (Rock Springs, Wyo.), July
24, 1986, at 6 (criticizing the rules and composition of the medical review panel). See also
Fredrick Lee Fisch, Comment, An Obstacle Course to Court: A First Look at Wyoming's
Medical Review Panel Act, 22 LAND & WATER L. RaV. 489, 490 (1987).
57. Fisch, supra note 56, at 496-97; see also Medical Panel Achieves Goal of Reducing
Claim Numbers, NORTHERN Wyo. DAILY NEWS (Worland, Wyo.), Dec. 18, 1987, at 12 (reporting the program's success in reducing the number of medical malpractice claims filed
in state court).
58. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (interpreting the Wyoming Constitution);
see Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (stating the proper
standard of review for equal protection analysis of medical malpractice legislation).
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now one of only a few states in which a court has found such legislation unconstitutional. 9
A second statute also directly addressing medical malpractice
liability fared better. This statute articulated the standard of care
for health care providers.60 In cases where the defending health care
provider was nationally certified, the plaintiff's burden of proof was
incieased from a simple showing of negligence to a showing that
the health care provider failed to act in accordance with the standard
of care set forth by that specific national certifying board. 6' In cases
where the health care provider was not nationally certified, the standard was defined as "the standard of care adhered to by health care
providers in good standing performing similar health care serv-

ices.

"62

The Wyoming Legislature also enacted reforms which had an
indirect effect on medical malpractice issues. Under one statute, an
attorney could be sanctioned, including payment of the opposing
party's legal fees, for filing ungrounded pleadings, motions, and
other papers. 61 Under another statute, the legislature authorized dismissal of an action where the defendant filed an affidavit of noninvolvement in lieu of an answer." However, the most significant
indirect reform was the elimination of Wyoming's doctrine of joint
and several liability.65
Prior to 1986, a successful plaintiff could recover all of his
damages from a "deep pocket" who was found to be a mere one
66
percent negligent under the doctrine of joint and several liability.
In 1986, joint and several liability in negligence actions was eliminated by amending the comparative negligence statute.6 7 The
amendment effectively limited a negligent party's payment to the
portion of the total award for which he was directly responsible.
Furthermore, the amendment placed the burden on the plaintiff to
attempt recovery from all the potential defendants or bear the cost
of the injury himself. The amendment's impact was significant be-

59. See generally Fisch, supra note 56, at 492-94 (discussing the constitutionality of
mandatory medical review panels under various states' schemes); Constitutional Challenges,
supra note 54, at 6.
60. WYo. STAT. § 1-12-601 (1988).
61. Id. § 1-12-601(a)(i).
62. Id. § 1-12-601(a)(ii).
63. Wyo. STAT. § 1-14-128 (1988).
64. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-117 (1988).

65. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, §§ 1-2 (amending Wyoming Statutes section 1-1-109
and repealing sections 1-1-110 to
DAILY NEws (Worland, Wyo.),
66. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws,
1973)).
67. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109

-113). See Joint Liability Bill Earns Praise, NORTHERN WYO.

Mar. 12, 1986, at 16.
ch. 28, § i (originally codified at Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp.
(1988).
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cause Wyoming statutes previously imposed joint and several liability on numerous potential civil defendants.6 Plaintiffs were now
foreclosed from recovering the total amount of damages from a
health care provider with deep pockets, thus discouraging plaintiffs
from filing suit where the defending health care provider contributed
only minimally to the plaintiff's injury.
Joint and several liability in negligence actions was also eliminated by repealing the statutory sections pertaining to contribution
by co-defendants. 69 Under these sections, a plaintiff could collect
the whole judgment from one defendant and leave this defendant
with the burden of seeking contribution from the other negligent
parties. The joint and several liability amendment rendered contribution unnecessary 70since each actor was now liable for only his
percentage of fault.
Since 1986, both the Wyoming Supreme Court and the Wyoming Legislature have taken measures which affected tort reform and
indirectly impacted medical issues. In 1987, the Wyoming Supreme
Court amended the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to strengthen
7
sanctions against attorneys who knowingly bring frivolous suits. '
The amendment added teeth to the previous rule which had merely
provided "appropriate disciplinary action" for "willful violations." '7 2 The rule now provides that the judge, upon one party's
68. Prior to the amendment, a number of Wyoming statutes imposed joint and several
liability on medical personnel. Wyo. STAT. § 17-13-303 (1989) (imposing joint and several
liability on partners); Wyo. STAT. § 1-31-120 (1988) (corporate trustees); WYo. STAT. § 1716-204 (1989) (persons acting on behalf of a for-profit corporation prior to incorporation);
WYo. STAT. § 17-19-204 (1992) (persons acting on behalf of not-for-profit corporations).
Although the tort theory of joint and several liability was eliminated by the 1986 amendment
to Wyoming Statutes section 1-1-109, sections 17-16-204 and 17-19-204 may impose joint
and several liability based on a contract theory.
Other statutes which impose joint and several liability are WVyo. STAT. § 17-10-118 (1989)
(directors of cooperative marketing associations); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-133 (1989) (persons
operating an unauthorized limited liability company); WYo. STAT. § 26-15-117(a) (1991) (insurers issuing joint or combination policies); WYo. STAT. § 26-27-120(a) (1991) (subscribers
associated with reciprocal insurers); Wyo. STAT. § 26-42-112 (1991) (life and health insurance
affiliates in insolvency); Wyo. STAT. § 17-4-122(b) (1989) (partners, officers, directors, persons controlling, and employees aiding persons engaged in the improper or illegal sale of
securities); Wyo. STAT. § 31-12-104(b) (1989) (automobile drivers who damage highways,
streets or appurtenances through negligent or illegal acts); WYo. STAT. § 35-18-103(a)(vi)
(1988) (mobile home warrantors); WYo. STAT. §.33-31-101 (1987) (warehouse bondsman);
WYO. STAT. §§ 34.1-3-116(a),(b),(c) and 34.1-3-605(f) (1991) (makers, drawers, acceptors,
indorsers, and accommodation parties of negotiable instruments); Wyo. STAT. § 11-19-505
(1989) (persons owning or controlling sheep carrying infectious diseases); WYo. STAT. § 1131-105 (1989) (owners of dogs which chase or kill livestock or other domestic animals).
69. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (repealed).
70. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
71. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11 (originally amended by order of the Wyoming Supreme Court
and published in Amendment to Civil Procedure Rule II, 730-736 Wyo. XIX-XX (1987)).
72. Cf. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (1957), reprinted in 397-401 Wyo. 25 (1966) (previous
rule). Although this amendment requires judges to sanction plaintiff's counsel for bringing
frivolous suits, defense counsel may similarly be sanctioned for frivolous motions during the
course of a trial. Id.
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request or upon his own initiative, must impose an appropriate sanction for a violation of the rule."
In 1988, the Wyoming Legislature amended a statute which increased the maximum liability of governmental entities for the negligence of the physicians they employ.7 4 Under this amendment, the
amount a plaintiff could recover from a governmental entity increased from $500,000 to $1,000,000. 71 At first blush, the Wyoming
Legislature appears generous. However, the legislature nonetheless
opted to retain a ceiling on plaintiffs' awards rather than allowing
unlimited recoveries.
3.

Wyoming Tort Reform: 1990 to 1993

Although the organized lobbying groups who pushed to enact
tort reforms have temporarily retreated, the Wyoming Legislature
continues to grapple with an array of new tort reforms with each
new session. In 1991, the Select Committee on Health Care addressed the perceived health care crisis and identified a number of
solutions. 76 In its report, the committee included tort reform on the
list of solutions. 7 7 The report further stated that the committee compemplated introducting a bill to reinstate a pre-trial medical review
panel.7 Although the traditional tort reform lobbyists have not
launched a recent campaign, the legislature is receiving new tort
reform measures "on an ad hoc" basis. 79 During the 1992 Legislative

73. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11. These sanctions explicitly contemplate reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees. Id.
74. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-110(b) (1988).
75. Id. § 1-39-110(b). For a discussion of the equal protection aspects of this statute,
see Troyer v. State Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 722 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1986). In Troyer,
the court held that the trial court's failure to find that elevator installers were covered by
the "health care provider" exception to governmental immunity was not erroneous. Id. at
162. The court further held that a $500,000 limit on recoveries against health care providers
did not violate Article 10, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution or the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 163-66.
76. Charles Scott, Report From the Select Committee on Health Care, 11 Wyo. Q.
UPDATE 42, 45-46 (Fall 1991). The committee reported that two causes of higher health care
costs were "[tlhe record keeping side of defensive medical practices caused by the malpractice
system" and the costs of "...
defensive medicine associated with our malpractice system."
Id.
77. Id. at 46. "There are some known solutions to the [medical] malpractice problems
(restrictive caps on awards, limitations on punitive damages, pre-trial review panels),..."
Id.
78. Id. However, the committee has not yet introduced such a bill. The committee
recognized that the Wyoming Constitution must be amended before reinstating the medical
review panel. Id. Instead, the committee introduced several medical and insurance reforms
at the 1993 Legislative Session. See, e.g., 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws chs. 50, 55, 83, and 90;
S.F. 0021, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (1993); S.F. 0025, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (1993); S.F. 0123,
52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (1993).
79. Interview with Pete Maxfield, Albany Cty. Senator, Wyoming Legislature (Mar.
17, 1993).
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Session, the legislature considered numerous tort reforms.8 0 Similarly, in 1993, the legislature was asked to review more tort reform
legislation. 8 ' Of those bills considered, the legislature enacted a few
even though the need for and effects of past reforms have never
been fully evaluated.
4.

Expansion of Plaintiffs' Rights: 1974 to 1993

At a time when Wyoming's legislature and courts were curtailing
certain aspects of plaintiffs' rights, certain other aspects have been
expanding. These expansions included adoption of a comparative
negligence statute and a selective abolition of governmental immunity. 2 Twenty years ago, the Wyoming law governing the attri-

80. In 1992, several bills indirectly impacting medical issues were filed. Legislative Perspective, supra note 11, at 6. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 0001, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (medical
injury-no fault compensation fund); H.J. Res. 0010, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (caps on
damages); H.B. 0128, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (punitive damages); H.B. 0103, 51st Leg.,
2d Sess. (1992) (limitations on contingent fees); and H.B. 0191, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (1992).
Each of these bills was defeated. Other general tort reform bills met a similar fate. See,
e.g., H.B. 0136, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (foster parent immunity); H.B. 0202, 51st Leg.,
2d Sess. (1992) (equine activities). But see Wyo. STAT. § 17-19-830 (1992). In 1992, the
legislature enacted a statute which granted immunity to individuals serving as board members
for non-profit corporations. Id. Although some people may view this legislation as a new
tort reform, the legislature merely recodified previously existing statutes. Compare Wyo.
STAT. § 1-23-107 (Supp. 1992). The previous statute provided immunity to both board members of non-profit corporations and government officials. After recodification, this statute
only applies to government officials.
81. During the 1993 Wyoming Legislative Session, the legislature did not consider any
tort reforms relating to medical malpractice. However, the legislature did consider numerous
non-medical tort reforms and enacted three of them. See, e.g., 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.
47, § 1 (limiting access to the courts in worker's compensation co-employee suits to only
cases where the injury results from a co-employee's intentional act); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 162, § I (limiting liability of those involved in equine activites); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 229, § 1 (creating a medical panel to review expenses in worker's compensation cases).
The legislature also considered other tort reforms relating to non-medical interests which
were subsequently defeated. See, e.g., H.B. 0013, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing
mandatory non-binding mediation); S.F. 0093, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing to
drastically rework the worker's compensation statute relating to physical impairment, vetoed
by the governor). But see 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 65, § I (extending the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act to cover the negligent acts of search and rescue personnel).
8;. Four significant changes unrelated to the medical malpractice crisis have also occurred. First, the Supreme Court allowed tort claims against co-employees rather than requiring the Wyoming Worker's Compensation system to provide the exclusive remedy. Mills
v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Mills I1]. See Stephanie Materi, Casenote,
The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II,
28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 271 (1993). The holding in Mills I expanded plaintiffs' rights
and opened the door for numerous plaintiffs to file claims in the state courts. Id. at 287.
However, in 1993, the Wyoming Legislature closed the door in the majority of such cases
by limiting availability of this procedure to only those cases involving intentional acts by a
co-employee. 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 1 (amending Wyoming Statute section 27-14104(a)). Second, the Wyoming Supreme Court expanded plaintiffs' rights by limiting the
doctrine of parental immunity. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Wyo. 1992).
The court decided that whether a parent was negligent in failing to fasten a child's seatbelt
was a jury question. Id. at 1161. The holding in Dellapenta may have opened the door to
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bution of fault in negligence actions was radically changed, resulting
in a significant impact on medical malpractice claims. In 1973, the
Wyoming Legislature directly affected negligence actions by amending the contributory negligence statute in favor of comparative negligence. 83 The amendment effectively increased the number of
plaintiffs who were entitled to compensation.14 The new comparative
negligence statute made it possible for plaintiffs to recover in situations where a plaintiff's negligence was "not as great as" the
defendant's negligence.8 5
In 1979, the Wyoming Legislature again significantly expanded
plaintiffs' rights by enacting the Wyoming Governmental Claims
Act. 6 Under this act, an injured plaintiff could sue the State or a
local governmental entity for damages resulting from the negligence
of public employees operating a public hospital or providing public
outpatient health care. In addition, the amendment made the negligence of health care providers employed by a governmental entity
actionable .87

total abrogation of parental immunity, which would greatly expand certain plaintiffs' rights,
thus increasing the number of actions filed. Finally, the Wyoming Legislature increased the
maximum amount to $2,000 that parents could be held liable for property damage caused
by their children. WYo. STAT. § 14-2-203 (Supp. 1992). Previously, the statute limited the
maximum amount of damages to $300. WYo. STAT. § 14-2-203(b) (1988). This may have
been an adjustment for inflation rather than an actual expansion of plaintiffs' rights.
83. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28, § I. See also Glenn E. Smith, Comment, Comparative
Negligence in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 597 (1973).
84. Smith, supra note 83, at 600. Prior to 1973, the contributory negligence doctrine
barred plaintiffs from any recovery who were found to be a mere one percent negligent.
85. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28, § 1. This legislation was first codified at Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973).
86. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to -119 (1988) (providing a new avenue of compensation
for injured plaintiffs by selectively abolishing sovereign immunity). See Oyler v. State, 618
P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1980) (acting as a catalyst for the Governmental Claims Act adopted by
the Wyoming Legislature in 1979). But see Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-120 (1988) (re-enacting governmental immunity for defects in the design, construction, and maintenance of streets and
highways). See also discussion supra note 51 (discussing the re-enactment as a part of the
1986 tort reform package). Prior to 1979, the Wyoming Supreme Court displayed disenchantment towards sovereign immunity. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1319-20 (Wyo. 1989)
(providing the historical background leading to the partial abrogation of the governmental
immunity doctrine). See generally Lawrence J. Wolfe, Comment, Wyoming's Governmental
Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions-A Statutory Analysis, 15 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 619 (1980). The Governmental Claims Act created a flurry of litigation and exposed
the State and local governments to enormous litigation and settlement expenses. The increased
exposure prompted the Wyoming Legislature to make additional appropriations and the local
governments to examine their current insurance coverage. Because of an increased caseload,
the Wyoming Legislature appropriated an additional $750,000 to the Attorney General's
Office to cover litigation and settlement expenses. From 1979 to 1988, the Attorney General's
Office defended eighty-six lawsuits claiming in excess of 100 million dollars in damages.
White, 784 P.2d at 1321-22.
87. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-39-109 to -110 (1988). All employees of the various county hospitals, public health facilities, University of Wyoming supported health facilities, and the
state hospital are affected by this legislation. Of the twenty-five critical care hospital facilities
in Wyoming, twenty are presently publicly funded. Telephone interview with Robert Kidd,
Pres., Wyo. Hosp. Ass'n (Feb. 15, 1993). These public institutions and other health care
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DISCUSSION

A thoughtful discussion of Wyoming tort reform must answer
two fundamental questions. First, did Wyoming experience a medical malpractice litigation crisis justifying past tort reforms? To answer this question, the discussion turns to Wyoming statistics and
statistical compilations from other states. Second, what were the
effects of these tort reforms? In answering this second question, the
discussion looks to statistics from other states to hypothesize the
likely effects of tort reform in Wyoming. Based on these answers,
this discussion concludes by proposing a future approach to tort
reforms in Wyoming.
Did Wyoming Experience a Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis?
Determining whether tort reforms were necessary in Wyoming
from 1975 to 1993 involves analyzing whether litigation crises actually existed. Litigation crises are commonly caused by two separate
phenomena: drastic increases in tort litigation and excessive jury
awards."
1.

Did Tort Litigation Increase?

When the Wyoming Legislature enacted tort reforms in the
1970's and 1980's, it was provided with little statewide empirical
data to demonstrate whether the tort system had caused either a

litigation crisis or a medical malpractice insurance crisis.8 9 Since 1986,

facilities in Wyoming presently employ 617 physicians, 5209 nurses, 34 anesthesiologists, and
numerous other medical personnel. Telephone interview with Rebecca Sabado, Licensing Officer, Wyo. Bd. of Medicine (Feb. 16, 1992) (data on doctors and anesthesiologists licensed
and practicing in Wyoming accurate as of Feb. 8, 1993); telephone interview with Becky
Wilson, Licensing Specialist, Wyo. Bd. of Nursing (Feb. 16, 1993) (data on nurses licensed
in Wyoming accurate as of Dec. 1, 1993). Excluded from the twenty-five facilities were the
Wyoming State Hospital and the various other non-critical care facilities directly funded by
the legislature. Telephone interview with Robert Kidd, Pres., Wyo. Hosp. Ass'n (Feb. 15,
1993).
Certain sections of the act also allow injured persons to sue the state or local governmental entity under certain circumstances. See e.g., WYo. STAT. § 1-39-105 (1988) (providing
an exception to governmental immunity when damages are caused by the negligence of a
public employee while operating a motor vehicle); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-106 (1988) (while providing maintenance for a building, recreational area or park); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-107 (1988)
(while operating an airport); WYo. STAT. § 1-39-108 (1988) (while operating a public utility
or service); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-112 (1988) (while acting within the scope of his duties as a
police officer).
88. See generally HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 5-24.
89. See DANZON, supra note 3, at 2 ("Participants in the debate over tort reform did
not have available to them then, nor do they now, much empirical evidence to resolve the
conflicting views of what caused the crisis of the mid-1970s and, more generally, of how
the liability and insurance mechanisms operate in practice."); Ed Won't Sign, supra note
20 (stating that the 1980's reforms were passed with little debate and supporting the inference
that little research went into the decision).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 5

610

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

crude statistical data have become available to aid in determining
whether a tort litigation crisis existed in Wyoming. 90 Generally, these
statistics show that the annual number of Wyoming civil court cases
filed decreased from 1984 to 1990 as Wyoming's population declined
and suggest that Wyoming did not experience a litigation crisis in
the 1980's. 91 However, these crude statistics are inadequate for a
detailed tort reform analysis for two reasons. First, these statistics
include significant aberrations. For example, civil filings inexplicably

90. These data, when combined with other Wyoming statistics, can be used to generate
meaningful comparisons.
Wyoming Civil Filing Trend 1984-1990:

FILINGS
PER
YEAR

FILINGS*

TOTAL CIVIL
POPULATION

TOTAL
POPULATION

PERCENTAGE
CHANGE

1984
1985

11,278
9,429

511,000
509,000

2,207
1,852

-16%

1986
1987
1988
1989

9,694
7,587
7,340
7,907

507,000
490,000
479,000
474,000

1,912
1,548
1,532
1,668

+03%
-19%
-01%
+09%

1990

10,907

454,000

2,369

+42%

*"Total civil filings" covers all civil claims filed, including tort claims, divorces, juvenile
cases, and contract-based claims, as well as criminal appeals and post-conviction remedy
proceedings. Total civil filings statistics compiled from COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1990 (WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, 125, 1992) [hereinafter Court Statistics Projects]; COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1989 (WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, 117, 1991); COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1988 (WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 129,
1990); COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1987
(WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 105, 1989); COURT STATISTICS
PROJECTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1986 (WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 173, 1988); COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANN. REP. 1985 (WILLIAMSBURG, VA: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, 234, 1987); population figures provided by Court Statistics Projects, 315 [hereinafter
chart]. Filings per 100,000 population and percentage changes computed by the authors.
91. See chart, supra note 90. More specifically, Wyoming's total civil filings declined

sixteen percent in 1985. Ironically, this decline occurred immediately prior to the time the
Wyoming Legislature was responding to the perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis
and was enacting numerous tort reforms. Id. at ". Nationwide, civil filing rates ".
. increased slightly during this period, but fewer courts were reporting significant increases from

1985 to 1986 .... " Craig Boersema et al., Tort Litigation in the State Trial Courts, 1981
to 1986, 13 STATE CT. J. 4, 5 (Winter 1989). The high correlation between changes in tort
litigation and population changes is consistent with statistics in other states. Id. See Brian
J. Ostrom, Changing Caseloads: The View From The State Courts, 16 STATE CT. J. 11, 12
(Spring 1992). Reduced variations in population-adjusted filing rates clearly show that caseload levels in the state trial courts are correlated highly with population. Yet the lack of a
perfect correlation between caseload volume and population suggests that other social, economic, and legal forces affect filing rates in the states. Id.
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increased forty-two percent in 1991.92 Second, these statistics are not
broken down in a fashion that makes them helpful to a tort reform
analysis. To be meaningful, civil court filing statistics should be
separated into tort categories. 93 Since present Wyoming statistics are
inadequate, this comment must discuss empirical analyses based on
other states' statistics and extrapolate those results to Wyoming.
Statistical compilations from 1981 to 1986 can be used to identify whether a litigation crisis existed nationwide. 94 Unfortunately,
when past statistics were previously analyzed, conflicting reports resulted since the methods and categories of analysis were not standardized. For example, tort reform proponents and opponents used
the same statistics, but reached diametrically opposed conclusions. 9
During this time, a Department of Justice study reported a litigation
96
explosion and linked it to the medical malpractice insurance crisis.
This report fueled the confusion because it failed to explain the
paradox arising from tort reform proponents' and opponents' differing statistical analyses. Moreover, numerous state legislatures re-

92. See chart, supra note 90. It will be several years before data is sufficient to explain
whether this increase is an aberration or a trend.
93. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 3. Only recently have statistics been compiled
which are helpful in deciding whether the number of tort claims filed in Wyoming courts
are actually exploding. The Wyoming Court Coordinator recently began breaking down civil
filings by tort category and will make the information available for the first time in 1993.
Telephone interview with Robert Duncan, Wyo. Ct. Coordinator (Feb. 26, 1993).
94. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 212-14 (discussing the 1986 Dep't of Justice
Rep.).
95. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 2; see supra text accompanying notes 16-32 (discussing the conflicting views of tort reform proponents and opponents).
96. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 212-14. The Department of Justice report concluded tort law was causing the insurance crisis and recommended eight changes:
I. permit no expansion of strict liability
2. take a number of actions, including greater deference to government agency
standards and findings, to assure that decisions about causation rest upon the
best available scientific evidence.
3. eliminate joint and several liability.
4. limit non-economic damages by placing a $100,000.00 cap on compensation
for general damages (pain and suffering, and mental anguish and punitive
damages combined.
5. allow for periodic payment of future economic damages.
6. limit the application of the collateral source rule except in situations in which
the insurer is subrogated to that portion of the plaintiff's claim
7. schedule plaintiff attorney contingency fees.
8. develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
The Department of Justice report also suggested other changes:
I. retreating from strict liability in products liability cases.
2. restricting the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
3. punishing lawyers who bring frivolous suits or raise defenses and reinstating
immunity provisions.
Id. at 217 (citing 1986 Dep't of Justice Rep., supra note 26, at 62-75). The Department of
Justice's study is now severely criticized because it relied on federal court statistics rather
than relying on state court statistics. Federal tort filings are a very small part of total tort
filings. Id. While federal torts did grow dramatically, the growth was probably the result
of mass tort claims. Id. (citing 1986 Dep't of Justice Rep., supra note 26, at 491-510).
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lied on the Department of Justice report and enacted reforms without
recognizing the study's flaws.
The first report to explain the statistical paradox was published
97
RAND Institute for Civil Justice (I.C.J.) in 1987. The I.C.J.
the
by
found that what had been previously regarded as a solitary tort
system was in reality a system with "three [categories] of torts, each
with its own distinct class of litigants, attorneys, and legal dynamics." 9 s The I.C.J. report divided total tort claims into ordinary
accidents, high stake torts, and mass latent injury torts (mass torts).99
This division was crucial to any accurate statistical analysis of growth
in claims filed since increases in the number and size of judgments
varied greatly among the three categories.100 Because the earlier Department of Justice report did not separate one tort category from
another, it did not accurately reflect the categorical growth variances.' 0 1
In contrast to the Department of Justice's conclusion, the I.C.J.
reported that malpractice litigation was merely growing moderately
and was not exploding. 02 What was exploding, however, was the
phenomenon of mass torts. 03 Courts in certain locations were overwhelmed because mass tort claims tended to surface abruptly in large
numbers and were geographically concentrated. l0 These mass torts
temporarily distorted court caseload statistics, creating the illusion
of a long-term litigation crisis. 05 High stake torts and mass torts
were not the source of any tort system growth beyond that corresponding to population increases.1° 6 The Department of Justice report failed to account for the distorting effects of mass torts when

97. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, 'at 2.

98. Id. at 2-3.
99. Id. at 30-31. The I.C.J. report describes ordinary accidents as typical automobile
accident cases. It differentiates high stake torts as those cases wherein the plaintiffs often
seek larger judgments, such as malpractice and products liability cases, Finally, "mass torts"
describes on-going litigation with multiple claimants, such as Dalkon Shield and asbestos
litigation. Id. at 11.
100. See id. at 30. The I.C.J. concluded that each side was describing different parts
of the tort system without categorizing by the type of tort. Id. at 34. Consequently, those
states who relied upon the Department of Justice made decisions based on a flawed analysis.
101. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 229-32.

102. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 11. This conclusion is reached by factoring out
the effects of inflation, population growth, and overall shifts in population from rural to
urban settings. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 10. Mass torts made their debut in 1981 as the first of many asbestos and

Dalkon Shield claims were filed. Id.
104. Id. at 10-11.

105. Id. at 10. An illusion of an explosion results because mass torts tend to be highly
concentrated and statutes of limitations can cause a large number of people to file claims
at the same time. Therefore, courts in certain locations can become temporarily hectic and

overwhelmed. Id.
106. See id. at 30. The I.C.J. study showed that ordinary personal injury torts such as
auto cases were ". . . growing slowly in frequency and cost." Id.
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it determined that medical malpractice litigation was exploding. 107
Mass tort distortion outside Wyoming may also have spurred
insurance availability and affordability problems here in Wyoming.
Wyoming insurance companies were using other regions for purposes
of experience. 0 8 Data from other regions, biased by mass tort litigation, may have caused lawmakers, insurers, and the public to
accept the insurance industry's proposition that medical malpractice
litigation was exploding in Wyoming.'09 This same biased data also
provided the basis for Wyoming insurers to raise prices and limit
coverage in the same fashion as in other, more litigious, areas.
In retrospect, the increase in Wyoming medical malpractice insurance premiums did not result from an explosion in the number
of tort claims filed in Wyoming courts. Understanding that torts
must be categorized to accurately assess their growth should prevent
misidentifying this part of a litigation crisis in the future." 0 Statistics
compiled and categorized as either ordinary accident, malpractice,
product liability or mass tort are most helpful in determining growth
trends."' Wyoming reporting practices have recently improved because, in 1992, the Wyoming Court Coordinator began to categorize
civil filings." 2 These better reporting practices will provide the data
107. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 232.
108. See 1988 Ann. Rep., supra note 36.
109. Id. In 1988, torts were categorized for the first time in Wyoming. Automobile
torts, not mass torts, make up the majority of all Wyoming tort cases filed. Auto torts
comprised thirty-one percent of all tort claims filed. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Personal
Injury Verdict Survey, Wyoming edition (Jury Verdict Research, Inc.) (1988). Nationally,
the tort caseload was also dominated by auto torts, accounting for between forty and sixty
percent of tort claims filed in urban areas. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1147, 1208 (1992); see HENSLESR et al., supra note 1, at 8-9. Any perceived rise in Wyoming
tort filings was probably a result of ordinary accidents rather than malpractice claims. Therefore, it is likely that auto torts accounted for the largest percentage of any civil litigation
increase during the 1980s.
110. Ostrom, supra note 91, at 12. It is also important to categorize all civil filing4.
This was seen when nationally, an analysis of total civil filings concluded "the increase in
1986 filings can be attributed to increased litigation in the general civil area-torts, contracts,
and real property rights-and not just torts". Boersema et al., supra note 91, at 14. An analysis
of 1984-1990 filings shows this trend is continuing. The most dramatic increases in the civil
caseload tend to be for real property rights and contract cases, not torts. Ostrom, supra
note 91, at 14. The increased litigation in all civil areas further corroborates the theory that
civil filings are directly related to population. Id. at 12.
111. Boersema et al., supra note 91, at 4-5. Considering torts as a percentage of total
civil filings provides another basis for measuring the amount of change in tort litigation
whether torts are becoming a larger component of state court caseloads. Additionally, torts
can then be compared to general civil cases, including real property rights and contract cases,
to determine if they are increasing more sharply and more consistently. See Adler, supra
note 27, at 731 n.218. To help accomplish tort categorization the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) was amended in 1987 to provide researchers access to the Department of Health and Human Services data bank which collects data on payouts and
medical malpractice claims. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1).
112. See supra text accompanying note 93. The new compilation method categorizes
claims into the various tort categories, as well as categories such as property actions, tort
actions, contract actions, etc.
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necessary to determine whether increases in Wyoming insurance rates
can be justified by actual statewide injury and damage patterns.
2.

Were Jury Awards Excessive?

At first glance, anecdotal stories of seemingly outrageous jury
awards appear to support a litigation crisis theory." 3 An I.C.J. study
of jury awards over a twenty-five year period confirmed the existence of substantial growth in jury awards nationwide. This study
further indicated an increased probability that a plaintiff would recover." 4 These findings can be explained, however, because juries
progressively more serious injuries
were also seeing cases involving
5
and larger medical expenses."1
The I.C.J. study also found that juries were awarded more
money in either a product liability or a malpractice suit or action
than in auto accident suits for injuries of the same degree of severity. 1 6 However, a recent federal study of damage awards in five
states found that damage awards were not "erratic or excessive,"
but were reasonably aligned with plaintiffs' injuries.' 17A small fraction of tort cases do receive excessive damage awards, and most of
the overall growth in the statistical average tort claim payment

113. Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 507.
114. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 17-19. The I.C.J. study consisted of data from
Cook County, California. In that area, average awards adjusted for inflation increased from
$59,000 during the years 1960-1964 to $187,000 during the years 1980-1984. In the 1960's,
plaintiffs won about one-fourth of product liability and medical malpractice cases. In contrast, plaintiffs won about one-third of such cases in the 1970's and half of such cases in
the 1980's. Id.
115. Id. at 21. This 1986 I.C.J. study based its findings solely on jury awards in malpractice and products liability litigation over the twenty-five year period ending in 1984.
Therefore, this study is free of the distorting effects of mass tort litigation.
116. Id. Whether this suggests juries are responding to the "deep pocket" effect or are
concerned with sending a deterrence message is unknown. Id. The I.C.J. study also confirmed
that, when appealed, the largest awards were routinely reduced on average by one half. Id.
at 22 (citing MICHAEL G. SHANLFY & MARK A.

PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY

AWARDS (RAND, Institute for Civil Justice, R-3511-ICJ). This "study involved 900 cases,
tried between 1982 and 1984 in Cook County, in San Francisco and in a group of smaller
California cities, including urban, suburban, and rural communities. The sample included
a full range of verdicts, from million-dollar awards to defense verdicts. Eighty percent of
verdicts were left unchanged. The reduced cases had awards more than three times the size
of the sample average, and involved reductions of almost half the original award." Id.
117. James Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Product
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 479, 482 (1990) (discussing, United States General Accounting Office Study, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case
Resolution (September 1989)). This study also showed that since the mid-1980s appellate
courts have increasingly ruled in favor of defendants in product liability cases and have
reviewed punitive damage awards with greater scrutiny - in many cases, reducing them. This
indicates there is self correction in the legal process for awards. Id.
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amount is attributable to these excessive awards." 8 These few large
awards have distorted tort damage figures in a manner similar to
the bias mass tort growth brought to tort litigation.
Any Wyoming statistical analyses available during the 1986 peak
of the insurance crisis were inadequate to demonstrate whether excessive jury awards had caused a litigation crisis. For example, one
study found that only eleven personal injury awards have exceeded
one million dollars since 1962.119 However, this study lacked the

information necessary to determine whether the eleven awards included medical malpractice cases or to compute what the average
medical malpractice award was in Wyoming. Second, although the
Wyoming Insurance Department compiled claim payout figures from
1985 through 1991, Wyoming jury award information prior to 1985
was sparse. 2 0 Moreover, neither of these studies were available in
1986 when-the Wyoming Legislature was enacting tort reforms. Since
Wyoming data was either inadequate or unavailable prior to 1986,
extrapolation using out-of-state data is necessary. The data from
other states suggests that Wyoming did not experience a litigation

118.
VERDICTS,

MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979, 22 (RAND, Institute for Civil Justice, R-

288 1-ICJ 1982). However, jury verdicts are not the best indicator of insurance claim payments
because the largest jury verdicts are often reduced by the trial judge or on appeal. Saks,
supra note 109, at 1280-81. One report states that jury verdicts were reduced in fifteen percent
of cases and increased in less than three percent of cases. Overall, "[diefendants paid an
average of [seventy-one percent] of what the juries awarded [footnote omitted]. The larger
the awards, the sharper the reductions. . ." Id. Unfortunately, most studies base their findings on jury verdicts rather than post-adjustment judgments. Id. at 1281 n.520.
119. Wyoming has the 42nd lowest average verdict in the country. Jury Verdict Research,
Personal Injury Verdict Survey, Wyoming edition (1988).
120. Claim payout figures include both jury awards and settlement payment figures.
The year 1985 appeared problematic for medical malpractice insurers. In that year, claim
payouts (direct losses paid) exceeded direct premiums earned (total premiums charged in a
year by malpractice insurers). Claim payouts did not remain a problem for medical malpractice insurers either. From 1985 to 1991, claim payouts have ranged from 3.26 million
to 5.28 million dollars with a mean average of 3.68 million dollars. However, direct premiums
earned have ranged from 3.84 million dollars to 9.76 million dollars with a mean average
of 9.16 million dollars. While direct premiums earned have tripled, the number of doctors
in Wyoming has not. In fact, that number has remained almost constant.
Year

Dr. Pop.

Dir. Prem. Earned

1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985

633
630
645
645
637
650
640

8,118,101
9,752,853
9,767,036
9,662,554
8,753,330
5,971,974
3,841,975

(in dollars)
Dir. Losses Pd.
3,871,724
4,651,331
3,932,486
4,708,076
4,109,232
3,253,109
5,282,109

Interview with Lonny Warren, Senior Examiner, Wyo. Insurance Dep't (Feb. 11, 1993) (providing raw statistical data).
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crisis as a result of excessive jury awards or settlements.12' Instead,
the size of claim payments in Wyoming probably exhibited normal
growth.2
In summary, no litigation crisis existed in Wyoming in the last
twenty years. Based on the analyses of tort filing statistics and jury
awards, the medical malpractice insurance affordability and availability problems were not caused by a malpractice litigation crisis
in Wyoming.123 Insurance companies did not consider the biasing
effects of mass torts or the jury award distortions felt in other parts
of the country when computing Wyoming insurance rates or limiting
coverage. Although tort filings, insurance claims, and payouts have
continued to rise over the decades, this rise cannot be considered
abnormal growth and it 2alone
did not precipitate the medical mal4
practice insurance crisis.
What Were the Effects of Wyoming Tort Reforms?
To answer the second question posed by this discussion, this
section first discusses the effects nationally of all tort reform measures, whether or not enacted in Wyoming. The Wyoming Legislature
did not enact all of the possible tort reforms. The section then hypothesizes the likely effects of Wyoming tort reforms using national
data.
Only recently has a long-term empirical analysis of the 1970's
reforms become available' 2 5 Suprisingly, the effect of certain reforms may be exactly the opposite of what was intended. Other
reforms have had no effect at all.
Generally, tort reforms limit plaintiffs' rights by reducing claim
frequency, increasing the certainty that a plaintiff would not win
and reducing claim severity. 126 Legislatures attempted to reduce claim
frequency by limiting plaintiff's access to the courts through reforms
such as binding arbitration, pretrial screening panels, shortening sta-

121. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 18-19; Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 117,
at 482.
122. HENSLER et al., supra note 1, at 18-19; Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 117,
at 482.
123. Ken Myers, Professor'sStudy of Tort System Finds No 'Litigation Explosion', THE
NAT'L L.J. (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 7, 1992, at 4.
124. See supra note 27 and accompanying text discussing insurance market cycles and
medical quality as additional causes of the medical malpractice insurance crisis.
125. Sloan, supra note 26, at 664. It is too early to thoroughly analyze the effects of
the 1980's reforms. Only since 1989 have the 1970 reforms been analyzed using pooled crosssectional data prior to, and well after, the 1970 reforms were implemented.
126. Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 513. Plaintiffs rights are impacted by limiting their
court access, limiting their awards and increasing their difficulty or costs for bringing a
claim. These limitations hoped to achieve the three goals of reducing claim frequency, reducing claim severity and increasing the certainty that a plaintiff would not win. Id.
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tutes of limitations and eliminating the collateral source rule.,2 7 Reforms measures aimed at increasing plaintiffs' difficulty or costs of
winning were usually attempted through reasserting a professional2
standard of care or strengthening expert witness requirements. 1
Finally, legislatures limited the size and severity of recoveries with
reforms such as ad damnum restrictions, caps on damage awards,
and eliminating the collateral source offset rule. 2 9
Of all the various measures enacted to reduce claim frequency,
only three could be empirically linked to actual changes in claim
frequency. 30 Two reforms had the desired effect, one reform had
the opposite effect of what was expected.' 3 ' Reductions in the statute
of limitations for medical malpractice cases and the elimination of
the collateral source exclusion'3 2 generally decreased claim frequency, particularly when those measures were applied in concert.'
Establishing binding arbitration systems tended to increase the number of claims significantly. 3 4 Smaller or weaker claims which ordinarily would not be litigated due to cost/probability of success
constraints were often pressed in the more straightforward, less costly
arbitration environment.' No other specific reform measure inshowed an empirical link to any
cluding pretrial screening panels
136
change in claim frequency.
1 Increasing the cost and difficulty of bringing a successful claim
was another intent of some tort reform measures.1 7 The underlying

127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Patricia Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 Oseo ST. L.J. 413, 416 (1987).

131. Id.
132.
The collateral source rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of any indication
that the patient has already been compensated by a source other than the defendant.

Although the scope of the statutes concerning the collateral source rule vary considerably, modifications of this rule have taken three basic forms. First, some states
simply allow evidence of compensation to be presented to the jury. Second, in
some states the jury is required to make a mandatory offset; the award is reduced
by the amount from the collateral source. Third, a jury is permitted, but not
mandated, to reduce the award by the amount of the collateral source.
Drucilla K. Barker, The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical MalpracticeInsurance Markets:
An Empirical Analysis, 17 J. oF HEALTH, PoL., POL'Y & L. 143, 149 (Spring 1992).

133. DANZON, supra note 3, at 416. Shortening the limitation period by one year reduces
claim frequency by eight percent. Id.
134. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 259.
135. Id.
136, Id.
137. DANZON, supra note 3, at 416. Many reforms were directly aimed at increasing
plaintiffs' litigations costs. These reforms decreased both the probability that a claim would
be paid and decreased the amount paid. Id. Examples include restricting informed consent
as a method to establish liability, setting requirements for expert witnesses, reasserting the
traditional professional standard of care, and restricting the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Bovbjerg,
supra note 15, at 527-30.
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idea of these changes to tort law and procedure was to increase the
risk of losing the action, thereby causing plaintiffs and their lawyers
to think twice before investing time and money. No specific reform,
or combination of reforms was found to reduce the "winning percentage" of plaintiffs' claims.""
The third, and most contentious potential impact of tort reform
concerns severity, or the size of awards made to plaintiffs by juries. 139 These measures have brought the intended result. Ad damnum restrictions, caps on jury awards (non-economic, punitive and
total), and the collateral source offset rule have been shown, in40
dividually and together, to reduce jury awards in varying degrees.1
Eliminating the collateral source rule causes offsetting other payments to the plaintiff against jury damage awards. This offset has
reduced jury awards and reduced claim frequency since small awards
are less likely to be legally pursued.
Tort reform overall was designed to ultimately reduce insurance
premium prices and improve insurance availability. 41 The body of
available evidence shows tort reform had practically no effect
on
143
premium prices,' 4 even though reforms stabilized coverage.
Tort reforms were expected to lower insurer's potential risk since
there would be fewer claims. Tort reform was also expected to aid
in predicting losses more precisely for the claims which were broufght.
This decreased risk of potential claims and increased certainty in
expected losses should have resulted in lower premiums. One study
found tort reform did limit and stabilize insurer's expected losses
for actual claims brought but did not decrease an insurer's potential
risk. Although reduced losses could have reduced premiums as hoped,
44
insurers instead, used tort reform to increase their profitability.'
The study concluded tort reform improved insurance industry
profitability while having little effect on decreasing risk. 45 This re-

138. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 3, at 257-258.
139. Id.

140. Id. The only tort reform which measurably lowers tort litigation is a cap on damages. However, damage caps are fatally flawed in three respects. Since a flat cap on damages
does not take into account a victim's age at the time of injury, it can lead to anomalous
results. The principal fear, however, is that caps will become part of business's, and the
medical profession's profitability equation. Calculating in advance the total tort liability
would completely circumvent the deterrence aspect of the tort system. Barker, supra note

132, at 158. Damage caps are unconstitutional in Wyoming, and the drastic step of amending
the Constitution has not be taken.
141. Sloan, supra note 26, at 633.
142. Id. at 642. But see Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 549 ("The common-sense, political
viewpoint is that "reduction" means a true drop in premiums rather than a change in the
rate of growth. An actual drop is much to ask in today's litigious climate.").
143. See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 549.
144. See Id. at 158.
145. Barker, supra note 132, at 158. Barker's 1992 study measured tort reform's effect
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suit is surprising since it was certainly an unintended effect by state
insurance industry proflegislatures. Overall, tort reform improved
11
itability for the period of 1977-1986. 6
Wyoming took steps to limit claim frequency by enacting a
shorter statute of limitations. Using national studies, the effect of
decreasing the time limit under the malpractice statute of limitations
would likely decrease the number of claims filed in Wyoming. 147
Wyoming also enacted the standard of care for medical personnel
in order to make it more difficult to bring a claim. 148 This was
expected to not only decrease the number of claims, but also to
decrease the probability that a claim would be paid and decrease
the amount paid. However, national studies show this result is unlikely to occur in Wyoming. 149 Wyoming reforms aimed at decreasing
claim severity restricted ad damnum clauses and eliminated joint and
several liability. Since the studies show that only caps on damages
resulted in any measurable impact on claim severity, these two reforms probably have had little effect in Wyoming.
Moreover, Wyoming malpractice insurance premiums did not
decrease. 5 0 From 1985 to 1991, total premiums have generally risen
while doctor population remained steady. 1 5 ' Using loss ratio as a
measure of profitability, Wyoming loss ratio data indicates medical
malpractice insurance company profitability has been high over the

on medical malpractice insurance markets. It used statewide loss ratio data to assess tort
reform effects on profitability and underwriting risk in the medical malpractice insurance
industry. Id. at 145. "Loss ratio" is the ratio of incurred losses to earned premiums. It
reflects the proportion of premium dollars that are returned in the form of loss payments
to those insured. Id. Relative prices, unlike absolute prices can be examined by loss ratio
data. Demographic variations among states are thus reflected. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 43-4.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
149. Imposing a professional standard of care raises plaintiffs' difficulty or costs of
winning. Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 548.
150. From 1985 to 1990, premiums earned rose from $3,841,975 to $9,752,853. In 1991,
premiums earned only topped eight million dollars. This drop was due to a refund paid back
by to doctors by the Doctor's Insurance Co. This insurer is owned by doctors. The refund
was paid after a review of the years 1986 and 1987. Interview with John McBride, Insurance
Commissioner, Wyo. Insurance Dep't, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Feb. 17, 1993).
151. From 1985 to 1991, the number of doctors remained relatively steady.
Year

Number of Doctors

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

640
650
637
645
645
630
633

Telephone Interview with Rebecca Sabado, Wyo. Bd. of Med. (Feb. 16, 1993).
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last twenty years.152 This is despite fluctuations since 1985.153 It is
unclear whether Wyoming tort reform measures caused the increased
profitability or if the increased profitability was caused by the Competitive Rating Act deregulation or some combination of each. A
comparison between Wyoming medical malpractice insurance and
other Wyoming liability insurance profitabilities shows that medical
malpractice
insurance is the most profitable line of liability insur54
ance.11

152. Malpractice insurers would strongly disagree with this conclusion. They claim adjustment expenses are very high for malpractice insurance because of litigation expenses. Id.
Unfortunately specific information about litigation expenses is lacking.
153. Loss ratio is computed by dividing direct losses incurred by direct premiums earned.
The lower the loss ratio the greater the profits. The Wyoming Insurance Department computed Wyoming loss ratios as follows:

Year

Direct
Premiums
Earned
(dollars)

1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
TOTAL

8,118,101
9,752,853
9,767,036
9,662,554
8,753,330
5,971,974
3,841,975
55,867,823

Direct
Losses
Incurred
(dollars)

Loss
Ratio

5,014,202
(7,487,655)
15,227,535
3,174,550
572,081
5,405,797
(8,513,821)

61.77
(76.5)%
155.91%
32.85%
65.44%
90.52%
(220.9)%

8,548,689

15.58%

Interview with John McBride, Insurance Commissioner, Wyo. Insurance Dep't, in Cheyenne,
Wyo. (Feb. 11, 1993).
Direct premiums earned is the dollar figure collected for that year. Direct losses incurred
includes estimated liability on claims filed that year, but not yet adjudicated. Conservative
accounting practices would dictate these potential liabilities be shown at or near worst case,
whether or not the claim would, in fact ever be paid. Direct losses paid represents actual
cash disbursements. Viewed over time it represents more accurately actual losses incurred.
Direct losses paid for 1985 through 1991 are below:

Year

1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985

Direct
Premiums
Earned
(dollars)

Direct
Losses
Paid
(dollars)

8,118,101
9,752,853
9,767,036
9,662,554
8,753,330
5,971,974
3,841,975

3,871,724
4,651,331
3,932,486
4,708,076
4,109,232
3,263,109
5,282,292

55,867,823

29,818,250

Id.
154. Seven year summary of Wyoming profitability results for all lines of insurance:
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Future Treatment of Tort Reforms: A "Second Opinion"
The Wyoming Legislature could adopt one of three approaches
to tort reform. The first is the "wait and see" approach. The Wyoming legislature could sit idle until it is clear whether tort reforms
are needed and what reforms would be effective. Second, the legislature could enact conservative reforms while further tests and
studies are performed. Third, the legislature could aggressively enact
tort reforms, relying on the process of trial and error to produce
an eventual cure.
An aggressive approach of enacting tort reform in the future
could inequitably compromise plaintiffs' rights and make it impossible to judge the effects of the past reforms. In contrast, the "wait
and see" approach might be unnecessarily passive. The Wyoming
Legislature should adopt a conservative approach by postponing any
major tort reform legislation until after the effects of past tort reforms can be fully recognized and analyzed.' 55 Some interim legislative action is needed, however. The Wyoming Legislature should
amend two past tort reforms affecting medical malpractice litigation
to provide consistent statutory application and articulate standards.
These amendments would correct past inconsistent interpretations
of the present comparative negligence statute and remove ambiguity
from the Governmental Claims Act claims procedures. In addition,
the Wyoming Legislature should aggressively facilitate insurance re-

Line of Business
Priv Pass Auto Liab
Priv Pass Auto Phys
Priva Pass Auto total
Comm Auto Liab
Comm Auto Phys
Comm Auto Total
Homeowners Mut Per
Farmowners Mult Per
Commercial Mult Per
Fire
Allied Lines
Inland Marine
Medical Malpractice
Other Liability
Workers Compensation
All Other
Total All Lines

Average Loss Ratio
77.8
60.7
68.5
56.0
47.6
52.5
80.6
56.7
52.9
37.2
68.4
39.3
15.3
74.9
25.8
67.3
62.8

Interview with John McBride, Insurance Commissioner, Wyo. InsuranceDep't, in Cheyenne,
Wyo. (Feb. 17, 1993). Figures provided by the NATIONeA. ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMISSIONERS, Profitability Results - Seven Year Summary (1992).
155. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (stating that the effects of past tort
reforms in Wyoming cannot accurately be identified because the Wyoming Court Coordinator
only began separating the various civil court claims filed into tort categories in 1991).
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forms by requiring insurance companies to base their experience ratings on reasonable statistics.
1.

Repairing the Comparative Negligence Statute

The Wyoming State District Courts have inconsistently interpreted the comparative negligence statute since it was enacted in
1986.156 If strictly construed by the courts, this statute should decrease the number of tort claims filed and size of judgments awarded.
The Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the comparative negligence statute to require that the percentage of negligence of all
"actors," whether parties to the action or not, must be decided by
the jury. 57 Even though the statute fails to define the term "actors,"
case law suggests that "actors" include all persons who may be
shown to have causally contributed to the tortious event.5 8
However, some Wyoming State District Courts have construed
the statute differently. 15 9 These courts continue to cite the 1981 Palmeno v. Cashen decision as support for taking certain negligence
allocation decisions away from the jury. t 60 Recently, one court liberally interpreted the present statute to allow joint and several liability in cases involving multiple negligent actors even when some
of the negligent actors were not haled into court and the defendant
did not allege that the plaintiff was negligent.' 6' This interpretation
made one defendant jointly and severally liable for all negligent
parties. 162 To the extent that judges rely on Palmeno v. Cashen to
take negligence allocation decisions away from the jury, the liberal
interpretation is flawed. Reliance on this holding is inappropriate

156. Compare Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 836-37 (Wyo. 1991)
(applying a conservative interpretation) with Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949,
962 (Wyo. 1990) (applying a liberal interpretation). See generally Alan W. Mortensen, Note,
A Marriage of Strict Tort Liability and Comparative Negligence Left Waiting at the
Altar?, Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991), 27 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 223 (1992).
157. Phillips, 806 P.2d at 835-37 (discussing apportionment of fault to all actors under
the 1986 amendment to Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109 which eliminated the doctrine of
joint and several liability).
158. Board of Cty. Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1981). This holding
expressly forbids liberal construction of the comparative negligence statute. In this decision,
the court held that "[t]he jury must ascertain the percentage of negligence of all participants
to an occurrence." Id. at 1188.

159. See, e.g., Jury Instructions, Andrews v. Bird-O'Donnell Constr. Co. (No. 234-77),
J. Hanscum, 2d Wyo. Jud. Dist. (June 24, 1992) [hereinafter Jury Instructions]. In Andrews,
Judge Arthur Hanscum denied instructions on comparative negligence. Id. The courts have
recently been inclined to act as super-legislatures and have construed several state statutes
more liberally than the Wyoming Legislature intended. See, e.g., Dellapenta v. Dellapenta,
838 P.2d 1153, 1167 (Wyo. 1992) (Cardine, J., dissenting).
160. Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981).

161. See, e.g., Jury Instructions, supra note 159.
162. Id.
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because the court in Palmeno based its holding on the comparative
negligence statute in its form five years before the 1986 amendment
abolishing joint and several liability. 63 In addition, the liberal interpretation unjustifiably punishes a defendant who stops to help
the injured, plaintiff but releases any other negligent person who
disinterestedly continues on his way and is unidentifiable for later
service.'6 The Wyoming Legislature should remedy the problem of
inconsistent interpretation by defining the term "actors" to mean
all persons who may have causally contributed to the tortious event,
whether a party to the action or not. Such an amendment would
add consistency in interpretation and prevent anomalous results.
2.

Repairing the Governmental Claims Act

Both plaintiffs and defendants would benefit from a thorough
housecleaning of the Governmental Claims Act. 65 The structure and
wording of the act present two interpretative problems. The first
problem lies in the structure of the act's statute of limitations and
the claims period.166 A liberal interpretation of the these two sections
permits a plaintiff to bring an additional claim for the same injury
after expiration of the statute of limitations, but within the claims
period. 167 The Wyoming Legislature should clean up the claims and
statute of limitations provisions of the act by amending the act to
make the claims period shorter than the statute of limitations period.
The second problem arises because one section of the act does
not clearly set forth whether a claimant must wait for the State to
act upon a claim prior to bringing suit. The section provides: "[i]n
the case of claims against local governments[,] the claim submitted
need not be acted upon by the entity prior to suit." 6 In contrast,
this language seems to imply that a claimant must wait for the State
to act on his claim before he files suit. Assuming this inference is
correct, the implications of this requirement are unclear. The statute
can be read to imply either that the statute merely requires the State
to act on the claim, but the statute of limitations period still begins

163. Compare Palmeno, 627 P.2d at 165-66 with Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988) (elimi-

nating joint and several liability).
164. See, e.g., Jury Instructions, supra note 159.
165. For a discussion of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, see supra notes 8687 and accompanying text.
166. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-39-113 to -114 (1988) for the statute of limitations and the
claims period of the Act.
167. See Opinion Letter, Peyton v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs (No. 91C-186), J. Lehman,
2d Jud. Dist., at 3 (Sept. 4, 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment when a second
claim was filed within the claims period, but after the statute of limitations had run on the
first claim).
168. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-113(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
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on the date the claim is filed or that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run in actions against the State until the State acts on
the claim. Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the statute
is ambiguous. The Wyoming Legislature should amend the act to
clarify whether a claimant must wait for the State to act upon a
claim prior to bringing suit. Failure to amend these two statutes will
subject all state funded health programs to needless uncertainty and
duplicative claims.
3.

Insurance Reforms

Reforms directed at the insurance industry need not be as conservative. Presently, all of Wyoming physician's malpractice policies
are underwritten by three insurance companies. 69 Thus, the W.I.D.
considers the physician malpractice line of coverage "noncompetitive."' 70 Based on this categorization, the W.I.D. has rightly exercised his discretion by requiring insurers to submit a statement of
intent to raise medical malpractice insurance rates for the Commissioner's approval. To date, the W.I.D. has not received any statements of intent to raise rates.'' This is a step in the right direction.
Involving the W.I.D. in rate hike decisions should ensure that any
future rate increases are justified by actual injury and damage award
patterns in Wyoming.
In the future, the W.I.D. should also require Wyoming insurers
to use experience ratings from states more consistent with Wyoming's current litigatory environment. Wyoming physicians are not
highly compensated by national standards, and claim filings and
damage awards in Wyoming also are lower than the national average. Many Wyoming physicians complain of spending a high percentage of their yearly income paying insurance premiums.1 72
Although empirical data from other states suggests that physicians
have spent the same percentage of their salaries on malpractice insurance for the last decade, Wyoming statistics suggest that Wyoming physicians have spent an increased percentage of their salaries

169. Interview with John McBride, Insurance Commissioner, Wyo. Insurance Dep't, in
Cheyenne, Wyo. (Feb. 17, 1993).
170. Id. See WYo. STAT. § 26-14-103(a)(vii)(D)(I) (1991) (defining noncompetitive markets).
171. See, e.g., Letter from John McBride, Insurance Commissioner, Wyo. Insurance
Dep't, to St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1988) (on file in with the Wyoming Insurance
Department).
172. See Rates Concern Obstetricians, supra note 1, at 12.
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on insurance." As a result, Wyoming insurers are making unjustifiably high profits by setting Wyoming insurance premiums on experience ratings from non-comparable states.' 74 If not using Wyoming
experience ratings, at a minimum, the W.I.D. should require Wyoming insurers to use experience ratings from demographically similar
regions. This should lower medical malpractice insurance premiums
without compromising plaintiffs' chances at justifiable recoveries.
CONCLUSION

Over the past twenty years, Wyoming has been experiencing a
medical malpractice insurance crisis. Acting on the belief that a litigation crisis caused this insurance crisis, the Wyoming Legislature
enacted numerous reforms. These reforms were designed to reduce
plaintiffs' rights to bring suit or, if a suit was brought, to allow
merely a limited recovery. When enacted, the Wyoming Legislature
had little information on which to base these reforms. During this
same time period, the Wyoming courts have also been expanding
changing tort law.
Since these reforms were enacted, tort litigation reporting has
expanded and an increasing number of studies have analyzed the
reported statistics. Based on the new analyses, Wyoming did not
experience a medical malpractice litigation crisis during the 1970's
and 1980's which could have caused an insurance crisis. In addition,
it now appears that certain of Wyoming's past tort reforms were
only minimally effective in reducing either claim frequency or claim
severity. Other reforms were completely ineffective and even deleterious. On the positive side, however, the better statistical reporting
methods will eventually allow a more informed Wyoming Legislature
to assess the effects of any future tort reforms when enacted, without a twenty-year delay.
The direction of future reforms is the subject of continuing
debate. Little empirical data is available to predict the likely effects
of future reforms. Until solid empirical data is available to assess
past reforms and predict the likely effects of future tort reforms,

173. United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, HEALTH CARE IN RURAL
AMERICA 325 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1990) ("The incomes of rural physicians are
lower..."). Most of Wyoming would be considered rural by this national study's standards.
Id. at 35. But see Allen K. Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Alternatives
to Litigation, 4 J. oF HEALTH, POL., POL'Y, & L. 21, 23 n.10 (1990). While the cost of
malpractice insurance may be spiraling upward, the percentage of gross income spent by
doctors on malpractice insurance nationwide has remained roughly the same for a decade,
at less than four percent of income. id.
174. For a discussion of the Wyoming Insurance Department's recommendation to require Wyoming insurers to set experience ratings based on more reasonable statistics, see
authority supra note 36.
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the Wyoming Legislature takes the risk of enacting legislation which
treats the symptoms rather than curing the disease. For this reason,
the Wyoming Legislature would be wise to postpone all significant
tort reform efforts until solid statistical data is available.
However, the State need not refrain from all attempts to stabilize growth in medical malpractice insurance premiums. The legislature should consider amendments to the comparative negligence
statute and the Governmental Claims Act. In addition, the W.I.D.
Commissioner should consider greater regulation of medical malpractice insurers. Although a program to directly regulate medical
malpractice insurance rates would be cost prohibitive, the W.I.D.
Commissioner should require Wyoming insurers to use experience
ratings from states which reflect Wyoming's current litigatory environment. This would help to insure that insurance premiums are
reasonably aligned with the medical malpractice litigation climate in
Wyoming and would prevent insurance companies from profiting
excessively at the expense of Wyoming physicians and patients.
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